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This paper argues that the life-works of Norbert Elias and Franz 
Borkenau can be best understood together, as they were 
developed in close interaction during the 1930s. Deriving 
inspiration from Freud, they took up the project formulated by 
Weber at the end of his 'Anticritical Last Word'. However, in two 
significant respects they went beyond the Weberian problematics. 
First, overcoming the centrality attributed to economic concerns, 
they rooted the Western civilising process in the long-term 
attempts to harness the violence that was escalated by the 
emergence and then the collapse of the Roman Empire. Second, 
they emphasised the crucial importance of periods of transition 
that follow an overall dissolution of order and that stamp the 
possible future course of events.
























































































































































































After long decades of almost complete neglect, the work of Elias 
recently started to receive the attention it deserves. The main 
aspects of his life and work are well researched and known 
(Fletcher, 1997, Korte, 1997, Mennell, 1992, Tabboni, 1993). 
However, the general assessment of his work still cannot be 
considered as settled. While the Civilising Process and Court Society 
are generally regarded as classics of historical sociology, the 
theoretical and methodological considerations of Elias are 
appreciated only among a small circle of adherents, while the 
work still encounters considerable resistance among mainstream, 
critical and post-modern sociologists.
This situation points to a series of as yet unresolved 
problems. These start with the reasons for the long neglect, a 
question that is posed in the literature on Elias since the beginning 
of his discovery, and that considerably bothered Elias himself. (1) 
Due to this neglect, the reception had a major effect on the entire 
course of the work. In the absence of feedback, Elias continued his 
work alone, developing his ideas in isolation, having hardly any 
publications for three decades. Therefore, the establishment of 
links between the work of Elias and of other contemporary social 
thinkers remains of vital importance (Breuer, 1994; Mennell, 1992: 
284; Smith, 1997; Stokes, 1997; van Krieken, 1990).
However, one of the more intriguing aspects of the work of 
Elias is that, in distinction to most of those thinkers who worked 
alone and in isolation, his central concepts have a distinctly 
interactive, dialogical character. This is all the stranger as in the 
case of Elias, there are hardly any thinkers who are known to have 
exerted a major impact on the development of his ideas. Among 
the classics, only the influence of Freud is acknowledged. But Elias 
developed the ideas of Freud in a quite original manner, and can 
by no means be considered a Freudian. Among his 
contemporaries, the only name mentioned is Karl Mannheim's 
(Kilminster, 1993). However, Mannheim was Elias's thesis advisor, 




























































































took up some of Mannheim’s ideas, the influence was by no means 
decisive.
All this points out a puzzle that so far has not even been 
formulated. Elias developed, evidently alone and based solely on 
his own thinking, a highly original approach to sociology that 
even today keeps drawing increasing attention and recruiting 
adherents. One of the main appeals of this approach is process 
thinking and the theoretical modelling of interdependence, as 
opposed to both methodological individualism and holism - 
approaches which, according to him, are based on the assumption 
of a 'homo clausus' (Elias, 1978). But these characteristics seem to 
be contradictory. A similar work simply could not have come into 
being under such conditions. Something is missing from the 
picture. Evidently, some crucial formative influences on the work 
of Elias has so far not yet been identified. If Elias is right, and the 
human being is not a 'homo clausus', then he could not have 
developed his ideas transcending the homo clausus' all by 
himself. But who could have been his conversation partner? Is it 
possible to identify a person and explain the reasons why this 
episode, arguably crucial for understanding the work of Elias, has 
so far remained hidden?
This paper argues that Elias indeed had such a conversation 
partner with whom Elias jointly developed his life project. He was 
Franz Borkenau. As the work and even the name of Borkenau is 
hardly known today, a few words of introduction to his life and 
work are due here.
Franz Borkenau: Life and Works
Borkenau was bom on 15 December 1900 in Vienna (Jones, 1992: 
457-8; Loewenthal, 1981; Russo, 1981; Tashjean, 1984). His family 
was half Jewish, the grandparents coming from Hungary and 
Rumania, and half Catholic. His father was a civil servant and one 
of his uncles achieved notoriety as head of the political police both 
in the Habsburg Empire and the first Republic. Borkenau was 




























































































old Irish monastery, and did not know about his Jewish origins 
until his adult years. Such a background at that time represented a 
particularly explosive combination and produced a very distinct 
life course indeed. Still in his high school years, Borkenau became 
involved in the emerging youth movement that was strongly 
influenced by the ideas of Freud. He then came under the spell of 
Marxism and in 1921, as a student in Leipzig, joined the German 
Communist Party. He became head of the Youth Movement and 
then for five years worked in a secret research group led by the 
Hungarian economist Eugen Varga. However, he got disillusioned 
with the Party during its Stabilisation and at the end of 1929 was 
expelled.
At that moment Borkenau intensified his contacts with the 
Frankfurt Institut which resulted in his first main work, the 
Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World View , published in 
1934. The book, however, was very coldly received by Horkheimer 
and Borkenau's relationship with the Institut can be considered as 
broken. After 1933, he emigrated to Paris, in 1935-36 taught at the 
University of Panama, and then settled in England until the war. 
In his influential monograph on Pareto he was one of the first 
thinkers to develop a theory of totalitarianism. With the passing of 
the years, reinforced by his eyewitness experience of the Spanish 
Civil War, his opposition to Communism became ever more 
pronounced, almost obsessive. He belonged to the circle formed 
around Arthur Koestler, called the 'charismatic wing’ of anti- 
Communism. From the late 1930s he published a series of books 
about the history and the contemporary situation of Communism, 
and also wrote many journalistic pieces. These works were 
characterised by Norbert Elias as showing an extraordinary skill, 
as they were written quickly and yet in a clear and well-structured 
manner (quoted in Papcke, 1985), and some of them became 
classics (Borkenau, 1937, 1939b). With characteristic incisiveness, 
he predicted the Sino-Soviet Split in 1952 - though, perhaps even 
more characteristically, his major analysis of 1 February 1952 
remained unpublished for thirty years (Borkenau, 1983; Tashjean, 




























































































manuscript dealing with the intellectual origins of the West, its 
central discovery being the role played by early Irish Monasticism 
in the transition to Europe (Borkenau, 1981), a contribution that 
still today is almost unrecognised.
Borkenau died suddenly on 22 May 1957 and, apart from 
occasional references to his classic studies on Communism, his 
work became all but forgotten. Some attention emerged in the late 
1970s when his work became championed by a very odd couple: 
the conservative sociologist Daniel Bell in the United States and 
the ultra-radical Italian thinker Toni Negri. As a result, his 
posthumous manuscript was finally published in English in 1981 
and in German in 1984, while translations of and commentaries on 
his work appeared in Italian, French and English. These works, 
however, failed to generate a momentum, not the least because of 
the difficulty of finding a proper reference point in which they 
could be located.
This paper argues that this missing reference point can be 
found in the work of Norbert Elias. The point is not simply that 
the works of Elias and Borkenau show a series of intriguing 
similarities, but that the two projects were in fact developed 
together.
The common experiential basis of the works of Elias and Borkenau
Even a cursory look suggests many commonalties in the lives of 
Elias and Borkenau. Both shared a Central European Jewish 
background, were in Frankfurt in the early 1930s, in Paris in 
between 1933-35, and then in London until the war. This 
parallelism was by no means self-evident, as Borkenau alone of all 
members of the Frankfurt school chose England as his country of 
exile 0ay, 1973: 38). Furthermore, during all this period they were 
friends and met regularly (Goudsblom, 1977:40-1).
The commonalties, however, go beyond the surface level. 
The life-projects of Elias and Borkenau were developed at the 
same time, under highly specific conditions, and together. 




























































































Borkenau are common, given by a specific 'figuration' whose 
components were the historical and biographical contexts and a 
mutually fertilising exchange of ideas.
The experiential basis of a thought can be reconstructed by 
combining the genealogical method, as developed by Nietzsche 
and Foucault, with the ideas of Victor Turner on liminality. 
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary' 
(Foucault, 1984: 76). Instead of general references to the historical 
period or the social structure determining the content of ideas, it is 
concerned with the minute reconstruction of the conditions of 
emergence of ideas, and their lasting effects (Nietzsche, 1967: 20). 
Genealogy, however, is not a new name for contextual 
determinism. The specification of the exact manner in which 
elements of the background are conditioning a type of thought, 
giving its 'stamp' (Weber, 1948: 268-80), was a central concern for 
Foucault just as it was for the other thinker who attempted to 
develop a precise methodology on the basis of the incisive but 
loose insights of Nietzsche, Max Weber. Instead of arguing for a 
direct lineage between context, thought and lasting effect, they 
both singled out a crucial transmission mechanism between issues 
of context and the substance of thought. This is the way in which 
the question is posed (Fragestellung ), or the problem is formulated 
(problématisation ) (Szakolczai, 1998).
However, this still leaves open the link between this process 
of question formulation and the actual historical events and 
structures. The emphasis on the 'stamping' and the 'carrier strata' 
of religious experiences by Weber (1948), and on the 'practices on 
the basis of which these problematizations are formed' by Foucault 
(1986:11), were attempts to bring this element into the picture. It is 
at that point that the works of Victor Turner, especially his concept 
of 'liminality', provides a solution. According to this, the 'stamping 
experiences' that lead to a new 'problématisation', identified by 
Weber and Foucault, happen in a transitory, in between or 
'interstructural situation' (Turner, 1967: 93) in which 'the past has 
lost its grip and the future has not yet taken definite shape' 




























































































type of discursive formation or the thought of a thinker, 'context' 
matters not in terms of particular social, political or economic 
structures that determine the content of ideas, but as periods or 
situations that are 'liminal', especially if they are liminal in several 
respects, forming a complex 'figuration' (Elias, 1978). Elsewhere I 
have shown that this framework can be fruitfully applied in 
reconstructing the major formative moments in the thoughts of 
Max Weber and Michel Foucault, and of Durkheim, Weber and 
Parsons (Szakolczai, 1996, 1998). Here I will argue that it can be 
also applied to Elias and Borkenau, with the further claim that in 
their cases these formative experiences were the same. This will 
start by showing that 1930 was liminal periods for both Elias and 
Borkenau.
In the 1920s Borkenau was an active functionary of the 
German Communist Party. However, in 1928-9 he got 
disillusioned and in late 1929 was expelled. Even though 
associated with the Frankfurt Institut earlier, he had been mostly 
immersed in politics, and it was starting from 1930 that he began 
serious intellectual work (Jay, 1973: 16). Elias also moved to 
Frankfurt in the same year and started to work on his dissertation 
as Mannheim's assistant. Furthermore, their situation was not only 
biographically liminal but also socially marginal. Apart from being 
Jewish and newcomers, both of them were in a borderline position 
within the two opposite sociological camps in Frankfurt. In fact, 
these opposite camps were also in the process of formation at that 
moment, because Karl Mannheim became head of the Sociology 
Department in 1930, while this was also a moment of transition for 
the Institut as its first director, Carl Griinberg stepped down in 
1929 due to reasons of health, and the new director, Max 
Horkheimer took charge in July 1930 (Jay, 1973: 24-5).
Finally, 1930 was also a fateful year in German history. The 
Great Depression broke out in 1929 and by 1930 the Weimar 
republic was in full crisis. There was an increased polarisation 
towards the Communists and the Nazis, and the militarised party 
troops started to make their presence felt (Fletcher, 1997: 172-3). 




























































































state from within through acts of terror, through the systematic 
use of violence' (Elias, 1996: 220) has started, a problematics that 
Elias repeatedly identified as his own, adding that this problem 
has not yet received a due attention (Elias, 1996: 220; 1994b: 58). 
Borkenau's work is rooted in the same the period and in the same 
experiences . They both started their first major work, Transition 
(Borkenau, 1976) and Court Society (Elias, 1983) in 1930 in 
Frankfurt and finished it around the turn of 1932/3.
All this only shows that due to a series of coincidences, Elias 
and Borkenau were in an identically sensitive and fertile position 
at the same time, and that they developed their projects 
simultaneously. The question now is to demonstrate that they 
indeed did this together. This will be done by reconstructing the 
underlying theoretical and methodological problematics of their 
work. In order to emphasise the connections and to make a strong 
case, their projects will be treated as sharing a common core, and 
the eventual disagreements and deviations will be mapped only 
with respect to this core.
As a final qualifying remark, it is important to emphasise 
that the article will not be concerned with the question of priority. 
Quite on the contrary, it will emphasise the interdependence, the 
joint development of the two projects, the manner in which 'one 
intellect caught fire from another' (Marianne Weber, 1986: 675). A 
search for priority would even be meaningless, as without the 
interaction none of the works could have come into being. At any 
rate, both Elias and Borkenau were strong personalities who 
already obtained a leading voice and an almost cultic standing 
earlier in their respective circles.
The common problematics of Elias and Borkenau
The thinker on whom both Elias and Borkenau drew most as a 
source of inspiration was Sigmund Freud, especially his idea that 
the understanding of human life cannot be reduced to purely 
rational explanations but must pay special and serious attention to 




























































































thought in the early 1930s, the next was positively unique: instead 
of taking Freud’s ideas at a face value, they opted for its 
historisation (Elias, 1994a: 484). They did so by arguing for the 
need of a historical reconstructive analysis of the very forms of 
experience, of the conduct of life, and of the forms of thought, 
through a historical analysis of words, categories, concepts, and 
texts (Borkenau, 1976: 15-9, 266-7; 1985: 97; 1987: 109-14; Elias, 
1994a: 42-3, 484). In one phrase, they wanted to historicise Freud 
by historicising Kant - a project with close affinities to that of 
Michel Foucault.
Such a project, however, needed an anchorage point on its 
own. This was found in the works of Max Weber, especially the 
various essays on Protestantism. Based on the inspiration derived 
from his encounters with Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
Weber developed an approach for the historical reconstruction of 
changes in the way individuals conduct their life and set their life- 
goals (Szakolczai, 1998). Taking up some clues from the Genealogy 
o f Morals , Weber put a great emphasis on the history of words, 
writing the 'longest footnote' in the history of social science 
(Hennis, 1988) about the etymology of the word beruf (Weber, 
1995: 204-11). Though Weber did not know about Freud when 
writing the Protestant Ethic , he read Freud carefully soon after, in 
1907 (Marianne Weber, 1988: 375). As the similarities between 
some of the key insights of Nietzsche and Freud were strong 
(Kaufmann, 1974: 182-3), it is not surprising that Elias and 
Borkenau, with their interest in Freud, found Weber's Nietzsche- 
inspired work particularly illuminating.
The claim that Elias and Borkenau took up the problematics 
of Weber must be taken literally. They evidently were not satisfied 
with the rather vague formulations contained at the end of the 
Protestant Ethic (Weber, 1995: 182-3), and went after the much 
more precise definition of the project given at the end of the 
'Anticritical Last Word' (Weber, 1978b). There Weber identified his 
interest as being concerned with the 'great process of development 
which lies between the highly labile late medieval developments 




























































































decisive for capitalism in its contemporary form' (Weber, 1978b: 
1128, italics as in original German). This set the problem for both 
Elias and Borkenau, though Elias laid the emphasis on the exact 
dynamics of this process of development, while Borkenau was 
more interested in the role of the mechanisation.
Weber identified as a crucial element of this process, the 
target of his immediate attention and the 'prerequisite ’ for its 
emergence as 'the creation and diffusion of the rationalist and 
antitraditionalist "spirit" and the entire range of behaviour (das 
ganze Menschentum ) to which in practice it was assimilated' 
(Weber, 1978b: 1128-9). Here Elias and Borkenau again followed 
Weber, with the same difference of accents. Borkenau attempted to 
further identify this particular 'spirit' that was conducive to 
capitalism, finding it not only in Calvinism but also in neo­
stoicism, in the Molinist version of Jesuitism, or in the 
philosophies of Descartes and Pascal, while Elias focussed on 
effective changes in life conduct (1994a: xiii-iv). Finally, Weber 
identified two possible projects by which such an investigation can 
be pursued in the most fruitful manner, a 'history of modern 
science ' and a 'history of the modern conduct o f life 
(Lebensfuhrung)', in both instances emphasising the link with the 
economy and making it clear that in his own work he opted for the 
second project. These are, indeed, the twin projects Elias and 
Borkenau decided to take up, with the usual differences of accent. 
Elias followed Weber by chosing the second project, while 
Borkenau put the emphasis on the first. However, and much more 
than Weber, both attempted to extend their work to the relations 
between the two axes. Elias made frequent remarks on the history 
of science and planned to write his Habilitation on the origins of 
modern scientific thinking in Florence (Elias, 1994b: 41, 98). 
Borkenau was even more ambitious. The Transition contains an 
analysis of the common mechanistic world-view underlying 
modem science and the practical mass morality which rendered 
modem capitalism possible.
The argument can be made even tighter by bringing together 




























































































can be defined as being concerned with uncovering the exact 
dynamics of the 'great process of development' that led to the 
emergence of a type of Menschentum that is associated with the 
taken for granted modern forms of the civilised Lebensfiihrung; 
while the project of Borkenau was to identify the 'spirit' that 
became the 'prequisite' at the same time for modern science and 
the 'mechanisation of technology' that was central for capitalism. 
(2)
If indeed Borkenau and Elias literally took up, word by 
word, the project as outlined by Weber, it is be explained why this 
connection remained so far overlooked. There are, however, 
simple reasons. In their first major works Elias and Borkenau were 
both quite explicit in their references to Weber (Borkenau, 1976: 
152-9, Elias, 1983: 37-42). Borkenau even states in his review of the 
Civilising Process that Elias’s work 'recalls the best traditions of 
Max Weber and his school' (Borkenau, 1938: 308). However, Court 
Society was not published until 1969 (in English only in 1983), and 
by that time Elias's strong opposition to the Parsonian version of 
the 'theory of action' rendered it difficult to recognise the way his 
work was rooted in Weber. On the other side, Weber himself failed 
to take up his own project detailed at the end of the 'Anticritical 
Last Word' and turned instead to the Economic Ethic o f World 
Religions . Reinforced by his negative remarks made in the first 
footnote to the Protestant Ethic , this project fall into an almost 
complete oblivion until being rediscovered by Hennis (1988).
Steps beyond Weber
It was by following the problematics as defined by Max Weber 
that Elias and Borkenau channeled the inspiration derived from 
Freud into historically oriented and theoretically guided 
sociological work. However, the strong presence of Freud implied 
a series of significant modifications. Their approach was much 
more sensitive to emotions and feelings, as opposed to the 
Weberian emphasis on rationality. In his typology, Weber 




























































































identify the process of the rationalisation of the conduct of life 
with a complete elimination of the emotional aspects of behaviour, 
he certainly implied a definite directionality (cf. Schluchter, 1996: 
249). In contradistinction, Elias attributed a crucial place to the 
feelings of anxiety, fear, even guilt in his account of the civilising 
process (Elias, 1994a: xv, 449-50, 518-23). Borkenau similarly gave 
much emphasis to emotions. This is visible in the way he rooted 
the tragic view of man and the world, underlying the mechanistic 
Weltbild , in the fears and anxieties produced by the transitoriness 
of the 16-17th centuries, and in the subsequent labelling of 
transitory periods as 'paranoid ages' dominated by feelings of guilt 
(Borkenau, 1981: 390-402; 1987) - a concern recalling not only 
Freud, but also Nietzsche and Weber.
One could argue that the relative shift from rationality to 
emotions is only a matter of accents. For Weber, the rational, 
methodical conduct of life was a way of controlling impulsive, 
emotional behaviour. Similarly, for Elias, the civilising process 
represented the gradual increase of the internal as opposed to the 
external control of life-conduct. And if Elias and Borkenau placed 
such an emphasis on human emotions, Weber has not considered 
either the process of rationalisation an unmixed blessing. But in 
another sense, Elias and Borkenau made a decisive step beyond 
Weber, in a direction that became increasingly more relevant in 
this century. The first major reading experience of Weber was his 
encounter with Marx, and in a very deep sense Weber never left 
the problematics as defined by Marx. His central interest remained 
the economy, as shown in the titles of the major twin projects of 
his last decade, Economy and Society and the Economic Ethic . The 
major aim of these works was to pose properly the problem of the 
specificity of modern Western capitalism, and to lay down the 
groundworks for a possible answer.
For Elias and Borkenau, however, the fundamental questions 
were not economic. The specificity of the European line of 
development could not be explained by its economic 
characteristics alone, but had to be searched in the more all- 




























































































emergence of the capitalist market economy was only one, highly 
contingent answer. Any breakdowns or frictions of the economic 
system, however, rendered visible the darker forces that were 
channeled into the 'economy'. Beyond the Mmarxian problematics 
of the 'economy' and 'capitalism', from which Weber could never 
quite escape, Elias and Borkenau returned to the more basic issue 
of civilisation, and especially the link between civilisation and 
violence.
The shifts in substance with respect to Weber's position are 
paralleled by methodological displacements, the most important 
being the closer reliance on the 'genealogical method'. Weber 
himself was strongly influenced by Nietzsche's genealogy. His 
project The Economic Ethic of World Religions was modeled on the 
Genealogy of Morals , well illustrated by the long dialogue Weber 
had with Nietzsche in the Einleitung (Weber, 1948), while the 
introductory paragraphs to the sociology of religion in Economy 
and Society provide an almost textbook-like illustration of the 
genealogical method (Weber, 1978a: 399). However, Elias and 
Borkenau followed the central idea of the genealogical method in 
greater depth, basing on it the entire structure of their work. 
Furthermore, strangely enough, they did so exactly in the manner 
Michel Foucault would proceed some 25 years later.
The Genealogy of Morals has a tight structure. The first two 
essays introduce two separate threads. The first essay is on the 
origins of evaluations and revaluations, while the second on the 
origins of morality and law. These threads become connected in 
the third essay, in the figure of the ascetic priest. This model was 
very clearly followed in the three main 'genealogical' works of 
Foucault. Histoire de la fo lie , Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and 
Punish .
Given Foucault's explicit reliance on the genealogical 
method, this is not surprising. It is much more so, however, that 
the same model is followed by Elias and Borkenau. The first 
volume of the Civilising Process presents a series of changes in the 




























































































thread, the processes of the modern state formation. It is the 
conclusion of that work, and the first part of the Society of 
Individuals that was originally intended for the same conclusion 
but that was withdrawn in the last minute, that brings together the 
two separate threads.
The genealogical setting of Borkenau's Transition is just as 
clear. Borkenau starts by describing two separate threads, the 
history of the concept of 'natural law' and of natural right and 
social contract. The last four chapters of the book, on Descartes, 
Gassendi, Hobbes and Pascal analyse the way these threads were 
connected in the works of these four thinkers (Marramao, 1984: 
xxix). The same arrangement can be observed in his posthumous 
chef d'oeuvre, with the two threads being Irish monasticism and 
Nordic individualism.
The claim that the structure of the works of Elias and 
Borkenau are genealogical must again be taken literally. The 
works are certainly not dialectical, as the two threads are not 
conceived as opposites. Neither is it a simple synthesis of separate 
analytical concerns, and for three reasons. First, Elias and 
Borkenau both emphasise that they bring together aspects that are 
usually considered as unrelated. But second, they do not simply 
make surprise connections between areas that were previously 
thought as independent, but argue that it was exactly the actual 
connections historically made between these fields that constitute 
the invisible, taken for granted grounds of modem society. Third, 
these grounds were not produced by inexorable historical 
developments, but by processes of thought. Therefore, the 
contingent character of these grounds can be rendered visible by 
reconstructing the historicity of the forms of thought underlying 
them.
The third major innovation in the works of Elias and Borkenau is 
that by placing the accent on periods of transition, they managed 
to fill a crucial gap in the thought of Weber, and even of Foucault, 
by 'discovering' the missing link between experience, 




























































































even trace this concern to Weber, as in the definition of his project 
at the end of the 'Anticritical Last Word' quoted above, he 
underlined the word 'between' (Weber, 1978b: 1128). This, 
however, remained just a hint.
The problem of transition was clearly at the centre of 
Borkenau's interest. The word is contained in his book title and the 
concept is omnipresent in the book. Periods of transition, 
howwever, were important for Elias as well (1994a: 56-8,178, 309, 
514-8; 1983: 115, 156, 214, 235). Furthermore, far from taking 
periods of transition as a simple element of the historical context, 
Elias recognised the particularly fruitful, creative potential 
inherent in such periods of perpetual fermentation (Elias, 1994a: 
58,514). This interest in 'periods of transition' can be traced to Carl 
Griinberg, the first director if the Frankfurt Institut, who probably 
brought Borkenau in contact with the group (Jay, 1973: 16). 
Griinberg was an important figure in Austro-Marxism, and one of 
his main interests was the question of the transition from 
capitalism to socialism (Bottomore and Goode, 1978). In the early 
1930s this issue lost its relevance, and the agenda of Griinberg was 
defeated at the Institut . Borkenau, however, recognised that it is 
exactly the characteristics of the contemporary situation that call 
for its analysis as a period of transition, though in a manner 
radically different from the agenda of Griinberg (see also Elias, 
1994a: 309).
Moments of transition, periods in which both social 
structures and discursive rules of formation are suspended and 
lose their grip create tensions and contradictions, produce special 
opportunities both in actual reality and for thought. In socio­
political language, this is the time of political tensions and social 
struggles. In his 1934 book, Borkenau indeed connects class 
struggles to periods of transition as opposed to crystallised form of 
domination. But from the perspective of a thinker, such periods 
also offer special opportunies for reflexion as well (Elias, 1994a: 
517-8). Elias and Borkenau connect these two instances, and this is 
where their analysis becomes the most powerful. Major historical 




























































































in the past and an opportunity of reflection in the present. These 
two concerns are tightly linked at the very moment of transition, 
as such periods render visible the fundaments, are occasions for 
questioning certainties, the evidence of the taken for granted forms 
of behaviour (Borkenau, 1976: 21,149-51,190; 1985:106; 1987:113- 
4; Elias, 1983:110-3, 214; 1994a: xi, 44-5, 518), the time to pose new 
questions (Borkenau, 1985: 98; Elias, 1994a: xv-xvii). In moments of 
transition, the dividing lines between reality and thought break 
down, reflection becomes a pragmatic activity, as the joint 
dissolution of socio-political and personality structures renders 
both individuals and societies malleable. An 'effective history of 
thought', a history not simply of the doctrines and ideas trying 
either to represent reality or to provide normative or ideological 
guidelines, but a history of the forms of thought that are the 
conditions of possibility of experiences must focus on such 
moments of transition, as these - and only these - are the moments 
where, just like in actual rites of passage, reflection is immediately 
transformed into action, words gain power and thought becomes 
reality.
A study of moments of transition, however, cannot start 
with the passage itself. Intuiting the sequences of rites of passage 
as established by van Gennep (1960) and later by Turner (1967), 
Elias and Borkenau both agree that a study of transition must start 
with the rites of separation, or a dissolution of the previous order 
of things. Thus, the study of absolutism must start with the 
dissolution or disintegration of the medieval world order (Elias, 
1994a: 282, 513; 1983:217; Borkenau, 1976:152; 1985: 98,105).
In taking periods of transition seriously and in rooting them 
in moments of dissolution of order Elias and Borkenau were again 
helped by their interest in Freud. As opposed to evolutionary or 
Marxist readings of history, such periods of transition are 
dominated not by the alleged direction to which the change was 
taking place, but by the emotions stirred by the actual collapse of 
the previous order of things. Thus, far from being surrounded by 
an optimism and a belief in the bright future, such moments of 




























































































fear. These emotions sir acts of violence, leading to massive 
bloodshed and an overall sense of tragedy, pessimism and 
despair.
Starting the analysis by the dissolution of the previous order 
helps to identify the key actors of the transition period, the 
Weberian 'carrier-agents' (trdger ) of the transition process, and 
also its overall framework that stabilised the fermentation of 
liminality and in which these actors can be situated. Concerning 
the first, the analyses of Elias and Borkenau are again amazingly 
close. Concerning the second, however, they radically part way.
Elias and Borkenau both identified the social agents playing 
a crucial role in the transition period as an "in between" class, 
combining temporal and spatial liminality. The crucial role these 
concepts played in their first books has been recognised in the 
secondary literature. In the Court Society , Elias developed the 
concept Zweifrontenschicht (dual-front strata) (Elias, 1983: 262-7) 
that, according to Pieter Spierenburg, "can become an important 
contribution to the theory of stratification" (Spierenburg, 1977: 
364). In opposition to standard class theories emphasising clear 
positions of superiority and inferiority and/ or the dialectics of 
class struggle, the concept shifts emphasis to groups that are 
caught in a situation of tension between strata above and below 
themselves. The paradox of their situation is that 'they run the risk 
of undermining the ramparts protecting them from the pressure 
from below if they undermine those securing the privileged 
position of higher-ranking classes' (Elias, 1983: 264).
Borkenau proposed a very similar formulation when 
defining the gentry in a rather unusual manner, not simply as a 
particular group in Britain, but as an in-between strata that is both 
a leader of the bourgeoisie while nevertheless still belonging to the 
old ruling classes, possessing feudal privileges (Borkenau, 1976: 
172-9). As a result, it always remained external to the capitalistic 
world, while 'for the individual of the gentry ... politics [became] 
his profession (Beruf) and therefore his life destiny (Lebensschicksal 
)' (Borkenau, 1976: 176). Though Borkenau made it clear that he 




























































































choice was unfortunate, as even Febvre pointed it out immediately 
in his otherwise enthusiastic review (Febvre, 1962: 750-1), and it 
was also strongly attacked by Grossman (1987). No doubt due to 
these criticisms, Borkenau not only never used again the word, but 
also gave up on the concept. This was mirrored by Elias who 
would similarly drop the term 'dual-front class'.
The fact that after their first effort, both Elias and Borkenau 
abandoned the conceptualisation of 'in-between' classes shows 
that though this was a potentially fertile idea, it was not central to 
their endeavour. Much more so was the overall figuration that 
emerged as an answer to the transitional period of the 16-17th 
centuries, and that left a stamp, or mark, on reality lasting till the 
present. In the identification of this figuration, carried in the titles 
of their first main work, however, they also diverge. For Elias, the 
central concern was the court, or the formation of a 'court society', 
while for Borkenau it was a specific, general 'world-view'.
Elias on courts
The recognition of the importance of the court of the 17th century 
for modernity is a genuine discovery made by Elias. The absolutist 
court was considered to be an institution that in its characteristics, 
as depicted in the famous memoirs of Saint-Simon, epitomised the 
irrational nature of absolutism, and was thought to have 
disappeared without a trace. Neither Marx, nor Weber studied 
courts, and it is only very recently that historians started to 
develop a serious interest in them (Bouvier et al, 1984; Starkey 
1987).
Elias presented three types of arguments concerning the 
significance of courts. The first is historical. A study of the court is 
relevant for modernity as it renders explicit certain forms of 
conduct that by our days became invisible, taken for granted. This 
is very close to the genealogical arguments of Foucault. The 
second argument is more sociological and, as it has been 
recognised by Mennell (1992: 85), is close to the perspective of 




























































































special kind of total institution. In modem society, as Goffman 
(1961) showed, individuals are assigned to total institutions only 
in exceptional cases. This is associated with a complete suspension 
of rights, various repressive measures, and a strictly one- 
directional chain of command in which the supervisors do not 
belong existentially to the settings. Courts were also total 
institutions, though in a different sense. Membership was in a way 
voluntary, certainly not compulsive, and there was no absolute 
dividing line between the inmates and the supervisors. But courts 
were also all-encompassing, as a certain number of individuals 
were constantly living together there, in a relatively closed place, 
under the scrutiny of all the others. Intriguingly, of the five type of 
total institutions listed by Goffman (1961: 4-5), courts ressemble 
most closely monasteries.
Under such conditions, special ties of interdependence were 
developing between all members of the court. One of the most 
important arguments of Elias is that the king, far from being an 
arbitrary master free to do anything he pleases, was just as caught 
in these webs of interdependences as any courtier (Elias, 1983:117- 
45). These interdependences were certainly not forming simply 
ties of identity and community. Quite the contrary, these were ties 
dominated by intense competition, rivalry and intrigue. However, 
due to the closed institutional and personal space, such rivalries 
had to be kept under strict control, both in terms of the immediate 
control of emotions, and the long-run coexistence of the rival 
factions. In this way, the 'courtisation of warriors' did not simply 
represent an external inforcement of a repressive type of control, 
but the 'civilised' habitus was formed as part and parcel of the 
everyday regular interaction. It was exactly this character of the 
court, the interdependencies formed due to its character as a total 
institution, that it left a lasting mark on contemporary Western 
society.
The third major point concerns the spread of these civilised 
forms of conduct from the small circle of the court into the entire 
social body. Here the argument of Elias again has two facets. On 




























































































argued, in the footsteps of Borkenau (1936). for the gradual 
dissemination of these forms of conduct by an imitation of the life­
style of the upper classes (Elias, 1994a: 460-65). On the other hand, 
however, even here Elias used his distinct type of sociological 
reasoning and claimed that the process was not unidirectional but 
one of mutual interaction: '[i]t is one of the peculiarities of Western 
society that in the course of its development this contrast between 
the situation and code of conduct of the upper and lower strata 
decreases considerably. Lower-class characteristics are spreading 
to all classes.' (Elias, 1994a: 461). In this way, elite theory became 
connected to Elias's theory of 'functional démocratisation' (Elias, 
1994a: 503).
Borkenau on world-view
The question formulated by Borkenau was identical to the way 
Elias posed the problem: in the insecure period of transition that 
was the 16th century, due to the collapse of the medieval world 
order, what was overall 'figuration' that provided a control and 
release, leaving a lasting mark on the entire subsequent course of 
Western history? However, the answer given in the 1934 book was 
different, less sociological and more philosophical. It was not the 
court as a total institution, but the emergence of a new world- 
picture or world-view ( Weltbild ).
A fruitful way to introduce this idea might be by contrasting 
it with the related concepts of Weltanschauung by Dilthey and 
episteme by Foucault. Dilthey was indeed the thinker with respect 
to whom Borkenau developed much of his ideas (Borkenau, 1976: 
vi, 153). Weltanschauung for Dilthey is an overall synthetic 
category that sums up how, in a given period, the ultimate sense 
of our existence is approached. It is therefore oriented toward 
content. Weltbild , however, has to do with form. It is concerned 
with certain axiomatic views and basic perspectives that render 
possible certain types of knowledge, value or philosophy. It is 
therefore close to Foucault's ideas concerning the historical a 




























































































complementary concepts. If Foucault's interest was in the prior 
assumptions about how to gain valid knowledge, Borkenau's was 
more in the reasons why the search for knowledge changed 
direction and modality.
According to Borkenau, periods of transition following a 
dissolution of order, like that of the 16-17th centuries following the 
dissolution of the Middle Ages, re-pose as a problem (in the 
language of Foucault, problematise ) all the basic relations between 
god and man, society and nature. The ideas about the harmonious 
order of the world by Aquinas and the scholastics, embodied in 
the concept of 'natural law', was no longer tenable. The god of 
providential harmony became a hidden or hiding god, a deus 
absconditus . The optimistic view about the goodness of human 
nature that Aquinas opposed to the earlier, ascetic views that were 
themselves rooted in the conditions of a previous period of 
transition and dissolution of order, the collapse of the Roman 
Empire and the emergence of feudal Europe, yielded its place to 
the pessimistic anthropologies of Calvin and Pascal about the utter 
depravity of man. The society of orders and natural law was also 
replaced by the Hobbesian picture of homo homitii lupus . Under 
such conditions, while political thinkers from Machiavelli to 
Hobbes attempted to restore order, the main task of philosophy 
became to establish the very possibility of an ordered existence. 
While for Aquinas, the ordered character of man's soul became the 
basis of the recognition of an order in the world - that is why he 
could transfer the legal concept of a 'natural law' to the external 
world -, for Descartes it was the security of the mathematical and 
mechanical character of the events of the external world that 
provided hope in a world where belief in the harmonious order of 
human existence could no longer be maintained. The mechanical 
world-view, on which the later advances of capitalism and 
modern science were based, was therefore itself a historical a 





























































































Though Elias and Borkenau differed therefore in identifying the 
aspect of the 16-17th centuries that stamped our culture in this 
crucial period of transition, they agreed in its most important 
lasting effect, the particular 'individualism' and 'subjectivism' of 
modern culture. Individualism, both as a central value and as a 
methodological assumption, just like the type of identity 
formation characteristics of the modem subject, are considered as 
self-evident, taken for granted in a matter of fact way. Following 
Weber and anticipating Foucault, Elias and Borkenau thought 
otherwise. Their work intends to explain the reasons for this 
individualism and subjectivism of modem culture, making use of 
their version of historicising Freud.
Far from being a universal given, the individual self 
represents a precarious balance between realities located outside 
and above - the external world and the culture into which one was 
born and raised, and which is taken for granted until being 
questioned in its elements; and forces inside and below - the 
impulses, forces or passions rooted in the unconscious. Any 
attempt by a single individual to reject the rules and norms would 
only leave one subjected at the mercy of violent passions, a state of 
anomie. Individualism therefore cannot be an autonomous 
process. Individualisation as a mass phenomenon can only start 
with an opposite event, the collapse of the established order of 
things, a dissolution of order. If modern individualism can and 
must be traced back to the 16-17th centuries, this is because it was 
rooted in the collapse of the medieval order (Borkenau, 1985: 98, 
105; 1987:111-2; Elias, 1994a: 310).
The central characteristics of mass individualisation are not 
much different from those of individual anomie, but are now 
produced on a large scale. The collapse of the stable frameworks of 
everyday existence produces anxiety and fear in which everybody 
can only rely upon oneself, men becoming each other's wolves 
(homo homini lupus , the term used by Hobbes, is used frequently 




























































































rule, not as an exception. Furthermore, the general collapse of 
standards not only leads to an escalation of violence, but also 
renders problematic even the most trivial and banal aspects of 
behaviour (Elias, 1994a: 58,518).
Due to the graveness of the 'situation' (Gadamer, 1975: 268-9; 
Jaspers, 1951: 9-35), produced by the collapse of the world order, 
merely political or legal answers were insufficient. Beyond the 
consolidation of political authority or the erection of new laws, it 
becomes necessary to reconstruct the modalities of everyday 
behaviour, almost from scratch, to provide models for a proper 
conduct of life (Lebensfiihrung  ). This entailed a charismatic 
renewal (Elias, 1983: 122), guided by a new elite who would 
manage to spread a more peaceful type of conduct of life for the 
entire population. Borkenau and Elias again agree in the way the 
question should be posed, the crucial problem being the education 
of the masses of atomised individuals, the ending of the 
dissolution of order by the development of a new mass morality. 
They only differ in the way they saw the solution provided. For 
Elias, this was the work of the courtly aristocracy, the taming of 
violence by the courtisation of warriors, and he emphasises the 
continuity of the process since the ll-12th centuries. Borkenau, 
however, placed emphasis on the break and followed more closely 
Weber in emphasising the importance of religious factors and 
general anthropological preconceptions.
In conclusion, for both Elias and Borkenau, the birth of the 
modem subject, or modern individualism, does not represent a 
liberation, the realisation of the true nature of the self, but is the 
result of a very specific kind of 'social engineering'. (4) This 
recognition, however, is not an occasion for generalised criticism 
or deconstruction. Quite the contrary, their careful reconstruction 
of the historical context, not in terms of stages of evolution, social 
structure or forces of production, but in the sense of the transitory 
or liminal conditions provided by a general dissolution of order, 
precludes any easy rhetorics. However, both of them are quite 
critical of a mentality, characteristic of those main sources of 




























































































German idealism, that considers the contingent answer given to a 
concrete liminal situation, the 'homo clausus', as a natural or 
universal given.
It is difficult enough to render visible any aspect of conduct 
that has become taken for granted. It is even more difficult if it 
concerns not just a particular attitude or behaviour but the very 
construction of the self. However, in case of the peculiar 
individualism that is characteristic of modern Western societies, 
there is a further complicating factor. This type of conduct, and 
this form of self, looks natural due to its mechanical character, 
based on the confrontation of interests that are assumed to be 
objectively given. Still, as Borkenau's 1934 work has shown, this 
anthropology is contingently based on the 'historical a priori' of 
the mechanical world-view.
Elias also had an interest in the study of science. Some of his 
first publications after his long silence were about the history and 
theory of science (Elias, 1972, 1974), and he kept up his interest 
even after (Elias, 1982). However, if Borkenau anticipated much of 
the post-modern interest in social constructivism, Elias certainly 
did not follow him and continued to use mechanic explanations at 
a face value. This is visible in their use of language. For Borkenau, 
the mechanic worldview is the main targets of analysis. Elias, 
however, defined his interest in the original Preface to the 
Civilising Process as 'the nature of historical processes', or 'what 
might be called the "developmental mechanics of history'" 
(Elias,1994a: xvi), and argued in the Conclusion that historical 
change follows 'an order more compelling and stronger than the will 
and reason of the individual people composing it ’ (Elias,1994a: 444; see 
also pp. 287 and 513). Furthermore, in identifying the major 
sources of these processes of change, Elias relies upon the very 
mechanistic forces of mass individualism, especially the pressure 
of population growth (Elias,1994a: 288), that Borkenau (and 
elsewhere even Elias; see Elias,1994a: 310) identified as the 
outcome of a dissolution of order.
This different assessment of 'mechanism' or 'mechanical 




























































































concerning ultimate ethical attitudes - ethical being defined here as 
related to the proper conduct of life, especially changes in it the 
conduct of life, implied by the findings. If the mechanical forces of 
interdependence, due to population pressures and relations of 
intertwining ( Verflechtungszwdngen ) (5) in which the interest- 
governed calculative behaviour of the modem type of individual 
is caught are natural or universal, if the modem legal state and the 
capitalist market economy ' together form the lock joining the chain by 
which men are mutually bound ' (Elias,1994a: 514-5), then the ethical 
consequence of the identification of the roots of modern 
individualism is the Stoic facing of this unavoidable fact. If, 
however, this entire line of development is a contingent response 
to a concrete, historical dissolution of order, then the individual 
can do more than resignate himself or herself to this fact. Thus, in 
the last page of his book Borkenau reiterates the 'existentialist' 
attitude of Rilke, calling for changing one’s life (das Leben zu 
verdndern ) (Borkenau, 1976: 559).
In the footsteps of the Civilising Process
The direct links between Borkenau and Elias and the joint 
development of the common problematics of their work is 
restricted to the 1930s, with considerable chronological precision. 
It was for this reason that so far the analysis was only extended to 
their works written in the period, with occasional references to 
later works only to indicate continuity. With the outbreak of 
W.W.II, their fates became separate. Though both were interned as 
enemy aliens, Elias was sent to the Isle of Man, while Borkenau to 
Australia. There is not much sign of their encounter after that date, 
until Borkenau’s early death in 1957.
However, it does not mean that their works became 
disconnected after the 1930s. Quite on the contrary, Borkenau's 
chef d'oeuvre on which he worked much of the last two decades of 
his life, published posthumously in 1981, presents the first, still 
untapped and arguably most significant, use made of the Civilising 




























































































of this classic work presents two major problems. First, it 
remained almost unknown for about three decades, only to be 
rediscovered in the late 1960s (Goudsblom, 1977, Mennell, 1992: 
18-9). Second, the English publication disconnected the unity of 
the work (Mennell, 1992: 32-4), publishing the two volumes in 
separate years, under different titles, the American edition of the 
second volume carrying a title different from the British, and even 
the joint 1994 publication of the two volumes separated the Table 
of Contents. Borkenau, however, was not only one of the first 
readers of the book, immediately recognising its significance, but 
the effect the book had on him much depended on the fact that he 
read the two volumes separately.
Borkenau read the first volume of the Civilising Process when 
the second was not yet available. It made a huge impact on him, 
was a genuine "reading experience". It built up in him a huge 
expectation, an intellectual tension. At the end of his review, he 
stated that for a full assessment of the underlying theoretical 
question, it is necessary to wait for the second volume (Borkenau, 
1938: 311). This volume, however, as Goudsblom (1977: 42) 
emphasised, did not fully satisfy Borkenau. But it did not mean 
that he turned away from the problematics. Quite the contrary, it 
was this combination that made him launch his major life project. 
It was the Civilising Process that genuinely 'projected' Borkenau 
into starting End and Beginning .
Borkenau took up and developed further Elias’s work in 
three significant respects. First, a civilising process assumes 
'barbarians' at its starting point, for which the Europe of the 16th 
century does not qualify. Borkenau took therefore a further step 
and started his account with the 'barbarian' origins of the West, the 
times of the collapse of the Roman Empire and the Frank conquest, 
the 5-7th centuries. He also anticipated anthropological criticism 
by arguing that the "barbarian" is not a sui generis category. 
"Barbarians" only exist at the margins of a civilisation (Koselleck, 
1985). By connecting the collapse of Roman Empire, the barbarian 




























































































identified a situation of dissolution of order as the figuration in 
which the Western civilising process can be safely rooted.
Second, a civilising process needs techniques and agents. 
Elias found the solution in the courts and talked about the 
'courtisation of warriors'. This, however, leaves open the question 
of how the court itself, consisting at first of the barbaric Frankish 
and Germanic chieftains, became itself civilised. While Elias did 
not put much emphasis on the role of religion and the Church in 
the civilising process, Borkenau identified as its main agents the 
monasteries, especially Irish monasticism (Borkenau, 1981). 
Finally, Borkenau took up the importance of the 'I-form of speech', 
a theoretical guiding idea that Elias pursued throughout his career 
but never elaborated historically, and found its origins in early 
fifth century old Norse inscriptions (Borkenau, 1981: 133-5). The 
claim that the dual origins of the Western type of conduct of life is 
given by the combination of Nordic (Viking or Norman) 
individualism and monastic (Greco-Roman and Christian) 
subjectivism is still a strikingly novel idea, and it was 
experientially rooted in the reading of Elias by Borkenau.
Habent sua fata libelli
This article argued for the very close relationship between the 
central problematics of Elias and Borkenau and the significance of 
this joint development both for the life-works of each and for 
social theory in general. Given that all this was so far almost 
completely overlooked, some arguments must be presented 
concerning the reasons of this neglect. Unfortunately, such 
remarks can only be speculative. One can proceed by analogy, 
emphasising certain character traits. On the one hand, it is quite 
well known that Elias could become almost prohibitive concerning 
some of those people with whom he had been on closest terms, 
like Karl Mannheim or Ilia Neustadt - indeed the two persons to 
whom the Civilising Process and Court Society were respectively 
dedicated (Kilminster, 1993; Mennell, 1992: 285-6). On the other 




























































































on the guard (Tashjean, 1984: 289), that is not surprising given his 
Communist background and the at once marginal and liminal 
status he had throughout his life. As they were non-central 
members of the opposite and opposed towers of the Frankfurt 
scene, they could have good reasons not to be explicit about their 
intellectual relationship. Furthermore, in the 1950s Borkenau was 
associated with radical anti-Communism (Hochgeschwender, 
1997), who in many circles almost till our days evoked animosity. 
But perhaps the most important reason could be the extremely 
heavy fate that came upon both relevant major books of both 
thinkers.
Court Society was finished in 1933. However, for decades it 
only circulated in typescript copies, read by a few friends (among 
them no doubt Borkenau), and was published finally in 1969. The 
fate of the Civilising Process is well-known. Only a few copies of 
the first volume got printed in 1937 (one of them was given again 
to Borkenau), the two volumes finally appeared in 1938-39, but 
actual circulation was very limited. Borkenau had a similar luck. 
Transition was published by the Frankfurt Institut in 1934 in 
German in Paris. However, Horkheimer marked a distance from 
the book already in his Preface and published in the Zeitschrift a 
very negative, and most unfair, critical review of the book by 
Henryk Grossman. Still today, the book is mostly known through 
this criticism. End and Beginning was left unfinished when 
Borkenau died in 1957. It was only published almost a quarter of a 
century later, in 1981. Even though there is a vague awareness 
about its existence, it never received a proper appreciation.
The reaction of Walter Benjamin to the first major published 
works of both thinkers can be considered as symbolic of the entire 
reception. The manuscript of the Transition was given to him in 
January 1933 as his first major assignment from the Institut 
(Benjamin, 1994: 400). However, after a year and a half, all he 
could do was to state that he finally gave up narrowing 'the orbit 
from which I have circled this fat tome' (Benjamin, 1994:459). Elias 
did not fare better. Benjamin was among those to whom he sent a 




























































































expressing his hope that Benjamin would write a review in the 
Zeitschrift (Schôttker, 1996). This, however, never happened.
Concluding remarks
Though in the past decades, Elias became a classic of sociology, 
the assessment of his contribution, especially for social theory, is 
still not uncontroversial. Part of the problem concerns the lack of 
connections established with the work of other social thinkers, 
both concerning its formative phase and contemporary reception. 
This article argued that Elias's work was not developed in 
isolation, but closely together with another major social thinker of 
the century, Franz Borkenau, by taking up and developing further 
the problematics outlined by Max Weber, all of them being 
inspired, to varying degree, in the background by the major 
’heretical' ideas of the 'shadowy' figures of Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud. By rendering explicit these connections, one not only gains 
a better understanding of the works of Elias and Borkenau, but 
also helps to link these to the analogous project of such an 
important figures of social thought as Michel Foucault. The 
bringing together of all these authors promises to provide a better 
understanding of one of the most intriguing questions of social 
thought today: the specification of the exact mechanisms by which 
the identity of the modem type of subjectivity, or the modem self, 
is formed, and the reason why the power exercised by modern 
societies is rooted not in external constraints, mechanisms and 
institutions, but exactly on these identity formation mechanisms, 
or 'techniques of self.
However, Elias and Borkenau were not simply sociologists 
who took up Weber’s ideas better than 'Weberian sociology', or 
predecessors of Foucault. In a very significant sense, both of them 
went further. As opposed to Weber, who - no doubt due to reasons 
of personal biography - always stayed rooted in a problematics 
focused on the economy and capitalism, and as opposed to 
Foucault, who - again due to similar reasons - was drawn to a 




























































































source of the European process of rationalisation, subjectivation 
and civilisation in the problem of harnessing violence, escalating 
in major periods of transition produced by a dissolution of order. 
Given the escalation of violence so characteristic of our century, a 
problem that is gaining increasing attention in our days, the 
common problematics underlying the work of Elias and Borkenau, 
complemented with the theoretical, methodological and historical 
analyses of Weber and Foucault, promises a particularly powerful 
approach to understanding the processes in which we are being 
caught.
Notes
(1) A sa  telling sign, when in a summary 1985 interview about his life-work 
Elias was offered the possibility of asking the first question, he turned to this 
problem of reception (Elias, 1985:1).
(2) It is of considerable interest and support that Eric Voegelin and Alfred 
Schütz, another important example for philosophical friendship in the 
century (Voegelin, 1981; Wagner, 1981), also developed their projects jointly 
and on the basis of Weber's work (Weiss, 1997).
(3) Borkenau's approach explains much the heat of current debates related to 
'revisionism' in the history of science. The defenders of the orthodox position 
are not simply arguing for the independent value of science and the search for 
truth, but hang on to the belief that a mechanistic world-view automatically 
solves any problem of theodicy.
(4) Apart from Weber and Foucault, similar ideas were elaborated by 
Oestreich (1982) and Hirschman (1977). Oestreich (1982: 32) knew the work of 
Borkenau and had a high regard for it.
(5) This is the word that has been changed by Elias in the English edition of 





























































































Anon (1985) L'esprit du m écanism e: Science et société chez Franz Borkenau  . Paris: 
CNRS.
Benjamin, W alter (1994) The correspondence o f  W alter Benjamin, 1910-1940 . 
Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adomo (eds). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Borkenau, Franz (1936) P areto . London: Chapman and Hall.
Borkenau, Franz (1937) The Spanish Cockpit: and eye-w itness account o f  the 
political an d  social conflicts o f  the Spanish Civil W ar . London: Faber and 
Faber.
Borkenau, Franz (1938) Book review of Norbert Elias, U eber den Prozess der 
Z ivilisation , Vol. 1 . The Sociological R eview  30, 308-11.
Borkenau, Franz (1939a) Book review of Norbert Elias, U eber den Prozess der 
Z ivilisation , Vol. 2 . The Sociological R eview  31,450-52.
Borkenau, Franz (1939b) W orld Com m unism : A H istory o f  the C om m unist 
In tern a tion a l . New York: W. W. Norton.
Borkenau, Franz (1976) D er Übergang vom  feudalen  zum biirgerlichen W eltbild: 
Studien zu r G eschichte der Philosophie der M anufakturperiode . Darmstadt: 
W issenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. [1934]
Borkenau, Franz (1981) End and Beginning: On the G enerations o f  C ultures an d  
the O rigins o f  the W es t , ed. by Richard Lowenthal. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Borkenau, Franz (1983) 'Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations', The China Q uarterly  
24, (June).
Borkenau, Franz (1985) 'L'origine della filosofia e della scienze moderne'. La 
Politico 1(2): 95-109. [1936]
Borkenau, Franz (1987) The Sociology of the Mechanistic World-Picture'. 
Science in C ontext 1(1): 109-27. [1932]
Borkenau, Franz, Henryk Grossman and Antonio Negri (1978) M anifattura, 
Società Borghese, Ideologia . Savelli.
Bottomore, Tom and Patrick Goode (eds) (1978) A ustro-M arxism  . Oxford: 
Clarendon.
Boutier, Jean, Alain Dewerpe and Daniel Nordman (1984) Un tour de France 
royal . Paris: Aubier.
Breuer, Stefan (1994) 'Society of Individuals, Society of Organizations —  A 
Comparison of Norbert Elias and Max Weber', H istory o f  the H um an  
Sciences 7(4): 41-60.
Elias, Norbert (1972) Theory of science and history of science: comments on 
recent discussion’, Econom y and Society 1(2): 117-33.
Elias, Norbert (1974) T h e  sciences: towards a theory', in Richard Whitley (ed.) 
Social Processes o f  Scientific D evelopm en t . London: Routledge.
Elias, Norbert (1978) W hat Is Sociology?  London: Hutchinson.
Elias, Norbert (1982) 'Scientific Establishments’, in Norbert Elias, Herminio 





























































































Elias, Norbert (1983) The Court Society  . Oxford: Blackwell.
Elias, Norbert (1985) 'Theory, C ulture an d  Society Interview with Norbert 
Elias', manuscript.
Elias, Norbert (1991) The Society o f  Individuals . Oxford: Blackwell.
Elias, Norbert (1994a) The C ivilising Process . Oxford: Blackwell.
Elias, Norbert (1994b) R eflections on  a  Life . Cambridge: Polity Press.
Elias, Norbert (1996) The Germ ans . Cambridge: Polity Press.
Febvre, Lucien (1962) 'Fondations économiques, superstructure
philosophique: une synthèse', in Pour une H istoire à part entière . Paris: 
S.E.V.P.E.N. [1934]
Fletcher, Jonathan (1997) Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the W ork o f  
N orbert Elias . Cambridge: Polity.
Foucault, Michel (1972) H istoire de la fo lie  à  l'âge classique . Paris: Gallimard
Foucault, Michel (1973) The O rder o f  Things . New York: Vintage.
Foucault, Michel (1975) The Birth o f  the C lin ic . New York: Vintage.
Foucault, Michel (1979) D iscipline an d  Punish . New York: Vintage.
Foucault, Michel (1984) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Paul Rabinow 
(ed.) The Foucault R eader . New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, Michel (1986) The Use o f  P leasu re . New York: Vintage.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975) Truth an d  M ethod  . London: Sheed and Ward.
Goffman, Erving (1961) A sylum s . New York: Anchor Books.
Goudsblom, Johan (1977) 'Responses to Norbert Elias's work in England, 
Germany, the Netherlands and France’, in Peter R. Gleichman et aL (eds) 
H um an Figurations: Essays fo r  N orbert Elias . Amsterdam: Amsterdams 
Sociologisch Tijdschrift.
Grossman, Henryk (1987) T h e Social Foundations of Mechanistic Philosophy 
and Manufacture', Science in Context 1(1): 129-80. [1935]
Hennis, Wilhelm (1988) M ax W eber: Essays in Reconstruction  . London: Allen.
Hirschman, Albert O. (1977) The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Hochgeschwender, Michael (1997) 'Freedom in Offensive: The Congress for 
Cultural Freedom and the Germans', paper presented at the workshop 
'Between Propaganda and Cultural Hegemony', Florence, 10 June 1997.
Jaspers, Karl (1951) M an in tht M odern Age . London: Routledge.
Jay, M artin (1973) The D ialectical Im agination: A H istory o f  the Frankfurt School 
an d  the Institute fo r  Social Research  . London: Heinemann.
Jones, William D. (1992) Tow ard a Theory of Totalitarianism: Franz 
Borkenau's Pareto  ', Journal o f  the H istory o f  Ideas 53(3): 455-66.
Kaufmann, W alter (1974) N ietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, A ntichrist . New 
York: Vintage Books.
Kilminster, Richard (1993) 'Norbert Elias and Karl Mannheim: Closeness and 
Distance', Theory, C ulture and Society 10(3): 81-113.
Korte, Hermann (1997) Über N orbert Elias . Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
KoseUeck, Reinhart (1985) T he Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric 
Counterconcepts', in Futures Past: On the Semantics o f  H istorical T im e . 




























































































Loewenthal, Richard (1981) 'Introduction' to Franz Borkenau, End and  
Beginning: On the Generations o f  Cultures and the O rigins o f  the W est. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Marramao, Giacomo (1984) 'Introduzione all'edizione italiana', in Franz 
Borkenau, La transizione dall'im m agine feu da le all'im m agine borghese del 
m ondo . Bologna: Il Mulino.
Mennell, Stephen (1992) N orbert Elias: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967) On the G enealogy o f  M orals . New York: Vintage.
Oestreich, Gerhard (1982) N eostoicism  an d  the early m odern state. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Papcke, Sven (1985) 'Wie das Abendland entstand', D ie Z e i t , 5 April.
Russo, Valeria E. (1981) 'Profilo di Franz Borkenau'. R ivista d i f i lo s o fia , 20: 291- 
316.
Russo, Valeria E. (1987) 'Henryk Grossman and Franz Borkenau: A Bio- 
Bibliography'. Science in Context 1(1): 181-91.
Schluchter, W olfgang (1996) Paradoxes o f  M odernity: C ulture an d  C onduct in the 
Theory o f  M ax W eb e r . Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Schòttker, Detlev (1996) 'Norbert Elias und Walter Benjamin: Ein Briefwechsel 
und sein Zusammenhang', in Karl-Siegbert Rehberg (ed.) N orbert Elias und 
die M enschen-w issenschaften  . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Smith, Dennis (1997) T h e  Civilizing Process and the Care of the Self: 
Comparing Elias and Foucault', paper presented at the 'Norbert Elias 
Centenary Conference', June 20-22, Bielefeld.
Spierenburg, Pieter (1977) T he Northern patriciate during the revolt of the 
Netherlands: a "Zweifrontenschicht " in the sixteenth century', in Peter R. 
Gleichman et ah (eds) H um an Figurations: Essays fo r  N orbert Elias . 
Amsterdam: Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift.
Starkey, David (1987) The English C o u r t . London: Longman.
Stokes, Paul (1997) T h e  "New Hegelians": Affinities in the W ork of Norbert 
Elias and Gregory Bateson', paper presented at the 'Norbert Elias 
Centenary Conference', June 20-22, Bielefeld.
Szakolczai, Arpdd (1996) 'Durkheim, Weber and Parsons and the founding 
experiences of sociology', EUI Working Paper SP S  No. 96/11.
Szakolczai, Arpàd (1998) M ax W eber an d  M ichel Foucault: Parallel Life-W orks . 
London: Routledge. (forthcoming)
Tabboni, Simonetta (1993) N orbert Elias: Un ritratto in tellettu a le . Bologna: Il 
Mulino.
Tashjean, John E. (1983) T he Sino-Soviet Split: Borkenau's Predictive Analysis 
of 1952', The China Q uarterly  24, (June): 342-5.
Tashjean, John E. (1984) 'Borkenau: The Rediscovery of a Thinker', Partisan  
R eview  51(2): 289-300.
Turner, Victor (1967) 'Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de 
Passage ', in: The Forest o f  Symbols. New York: Cornell University Press.




























































































Turner, Victor (1992) 'Morality and Liminality', in: Blazing the Trail: W ay M arks 
in the Exploration o f  Sym bols . Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona 
Press.
van Gennep, Arnold (1960) The Rites o f  Passage . Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
van Krieken, Robert (1990) T he organization of the soul: Elias and Foucault 
on discipline and the self, European Journal o f  Sociology  31 ,2 : 353-71.
Voegelin, Eric (1981) 'In memoriam Alfred Schütz', in Peter J. Opitz and 
Gregor Sebba (eds) The Philosophy o f  O rd er . Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Wagner, Helmut R. (1981) 'Agreement in Discord: Alfred Schütz and Eric 
Voegelin', in Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba (eds) The Philosophy o f  O rd e r . 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Weber, Marianne (1988) M ax W eber: A B iography . Oxford: Transactions Books.
Weber, Max (1948) T h e  Social Psychology of the World Religions', in Hans 
Gerth, Hans and C. Wright Mills (eds) From M ax W eber. London: 
Routledge.
Weber, Max (1978a) Econom y an d  Society . Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Weber, M ax (1978b) 'Anticritical Last Word on The Spirit of Capitalism', 
A m erican  Journal o f  Sociology  83(5): 1105-1131.
Weber, Max (1995) The Protestant Ethic an d  the Spirit o f  C apitalism . London: 
Allen and Unwin.
Weiss, Gilbert (1997) 'Political reality and life-world: the correspondence 
between Eric Voegelin and Alfred Schütz, 1938-1959', paper presented at 

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiésolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99














































































































The Accommodation of Diversity in
European Policy Making and its
Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a
Patchwork
SPS No. 96/3 
Daniel VERDIER
Gerschenkron on his Head: Banking 
Structures in 19th-Century Europe, 
North America, and Australasia
SPS No. 96/4 
Daniel VERDIER 
Democratization and Trade 




Democratic Convergence and Free
Trade
SPS No. 96/6 
Christian JOPPKE
Nation-Building after World War Two: 
Postcolonialism, Postcommunism, and 
Postfascism Compared
SPS No. 96/7 
Takis S. PAPPAS 
Grand Design, Narrow Choices: 
Conservatives and Democracy in 
Southern Europe
SPS No. 96/8
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI/Lâszlô FÜSTÔS 
Value Systems in Axial Moments: A 




In a Permanent State of Transition:
Theorising the East European Condition
SPS No. 96/10 
Paolo DONATI
Environmentalism, Postmaterialism, and 




Durkheim, Weber and Parsons and the
Founding Experiences of Sociology
SPS No. 96/12 
Christoph KNILL 
Patterns of European Policy 




Conceptualising the Left-Right 




The Theories of Ethnic Entrepreneur- 
ship, and the Alternative Arguments of 
Social Action and Network Analysis
SPS No. 97/2 
Harald WYDRA
Imitating Capitalism and Democracy at 
a Distance - Identifying with Images in 
the Polish Transition
SPS No. 97/3 
Martin J. BULL
From PDS to C osa  2 : The Second 





The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present 
& Future



























































































SPS No. 97/5 
Agnes HORVATH
The Political Psychology of Trickster- 
Clown: An Analytical Experiment 
Around Communism as a Myth
SPS No. 97/6 
Giovanni CAPOCCIA 
Electoral Abuse in PR Systems: Old and 




The Use of Political Conditionality in




Norbert Elias and Franz Borkenau:
Intertwined Life-Works
* out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
• ■
■
■
■
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
